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Change, Consolidation, and 
Competition in Health Care Markets 
Martin Gaynor and Deborah Haas-Wilson 
he health care industry is being transformed. Large firms are merging and 
acquiring other firms. Alliances and contractual relations between players 
in this market are shifting rapidly. Within the next few years, many markets 
are predicted to be dominated by a few large firms. Antitrust enforcement author- 
ities like the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, as well as 
courts and legislators at both the federal and state levels, are struggling with the 
implications of these changes for the nature and consequences of competition in 
health care markets. 
In this paper we summarize the nature of the changes in the structure of the 
health care industry. We focus on the markets for health insurance, hospital ser- 
vices, and physician services. We then discuss the potential implications of the re- 
structuring of the health care industry for competition, efficiency, and public policy. 
As will become apparent, this area offers a number of intriguing questions for 
inquisitive researchers. 
Changing Health Care Markets 
The health care industry in the late 1990s has seen three substantial, interrelated 
changes: the rise of managed care as a method to finance and deliver health care 
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@andrew. cmu.edu), and (dhwilson@sophia.smith.edu), respectively. 
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services; horizontal consolidation within markets for insurance, hospital services, 
and physician services; and the blurring of the vertical distinctions between these 
markets. We discuss these in turn. 
Managed Care 
Traditional health care insurance plans-like Blue Cross/Blue Shield-do not 
restrict either the provider or treatment choices of patients or doctors. Managed 
care, as its name implies, involves those methods of financing and delivering health 
care services that manage, or intervene, in care decisions made by patients or doc- 
tors. These forms of intervention include limiting the types of treatments or pro- 
viders from whom treatment can be obtained, requiring advance approval of certain 
kinds of treatments, and reviewing treatments provided. The common feature of 
all managed care organizations is that they provide coverage for health care ob- 
tained through a predetermined group of health care providers, commonly re- 
ferred to as a "network," that is selected by the plan. Patients who receive treatment 
outside the network must pay a higher share (sometimes all) of the costs. 
There is an alphabet soup of insurance plans going by various acronyms that are 
collectively referred to as managed care organizations. Two of the best-recognized 
categories are health maintenance organizations (HMOs), in which enrollees must 
receive all of their primary care from a designated "primary care physician," and 
in which coverage is provided only for treatment from a prespecified group of 
providers, and preferred provider organizations (PPOs), which provide coverage 
for treatment obtained from a network of separate health care providers who have 
agreed to provide health care to the PPO's enrollees at discounted rates. Managed 
care in these and other forms has grown to become the dominant form of employer- 
provided health insurance. The proportion of individuals with employer-provided 
health insurance who were in managed care plans rose from 51 percent in 1993 to 
73 percent in 1995 (Jensen et al., 1997). 
Under traditional reimbursement insurance, an insured consumer has little in- 
centive to consider price in choosing among providers. However, since managed 
care plans market themselves to employers chiefly (some might say solely) based 
on their ability to reduce the costs of health care benefits, price is a critical criterion 
for the selection of providers into their network. This result of managed care has 
been termed "buyer driven competition" (Dranove and White, 1994). It seems 
clear that the growth of managed care has led to increased price competition in 
health care markets. 
Changes in the Horizontal Structure of Health Care Markets 
Health care markets have seen waves of collaboration, integration, and outright 
merger these last few years. The market has so many players-hospitals, physicians, 
conventional insurers, and managed care organizations-that it is difficult to derive 
an overall measure of consolidation, but the trend is unmistakable. 
Insurers or managed care organizations are integrating with each other. There 
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were 62 HMO mergers and acquisitions in 1996, up from 28 in 1995 (Japsen, 1997); 
for perspective, 592 HMOs were in operation in 1996 (InterStudy, 1996). In 1975, 
there were 128 independent Blue Cross or Blue Shield plans; by May 1997 there 
were only 58 (Moskowitz, 1997). Two heavily publicized examples are the acquisi- 
tion of U.S. Healthcare by Aetna Health Plans in 1996, creating a managed care 
plan with 6.3 million members (Mlawsky, 1996a), and the acquisition of FHP In- 
ternational by PacifiCare Health System in 1997, creating a managed care organi- 
zation with 3.9 million HMO enrollees in 15 states and another 5.3 million members 
affected in specialty managed care products (Mlawsky, 1996b). 
Hospitals have changed ownership frequently. Between 1994 and 1996, approx- 
imately 41 percent of the 5,200 (non-federal) hospitals in the United States were 
involved in transactions involving changes in asset ownership (Japsen, 1996).1 From 
1985 to 1995, the number of hospitals fell by 9 percent, from 5,732 to 5,194, and 
the number of hospital beds fell by 13 percent, from 1 million to 873,000. None- 
theless, the hospital bed occupancy rate, the most commonly used measure of ca- 
pacity utilization, declined from 64.5 percent in 1990 to 59.7 percent in 1995 (Sen- 
senig et al., 1996). The proportion of hospitals that are for-profit, as opposed to 
non-profit or public, barely increased from 14.0 percent to 14.4 percent from 1985 
to 1995. 
Physician markets have also undergone tremendous restructuring. By 1995, just 
over a quarter of all practicing physicians remained as solo practitioners, down from 
over a third in 1991. The share of physicians employed by hospitals or HMOs in- 
creased from 22 percent in 1991 to 30 percent in 1995 (Emmons and Kletke, 1996). 
At the same time, the average size of medical group practices has been increasing. 
There were over 218 mergers and acquisitions of physician practices in 1996, up 
from 126 in 1995 (Japsen, 1997). 
There has also been tremendous growth in Independent Practice Associations 
(IPAs), groups of independent practices who collectively contract with managed 
care plans to be part of their provider network. As of August 1996, there were 
approximately 4,000 IPAs with an average of 300 physicians each, up from approx- 
imately 1,500 in 1990.2 A new form of organization which has emerged in this 
market in the past five years, the physician management firm, both sells manage- 
ment services to physician practices, including negotiation and marketing with man- 
aged care plans, and also owns physician practices. As of August 1996, at least 22 
public and many private physician management firms (PPMs) were buying and 
managing physician practices (Scott, 1996). Three of the largest PPMs, Medpart- 
ners, FPA Medical Management,3 and UniMed, have grown very rapidly through 
' Short term general hospitals are what is commonly meant by the term "hospital." The other types of 
hospitals are specialized facilities or long-stay facilities, such as psychiatric or rehabilitation hospitals. 
2 Estimates by Albert Holloway of the IPA Association of America, Modern Healthcare, August 5, 1996, 
p. 86. 
'This trend has recently seemed to reverse itself. In July 1998, FPA Medical Management filed for 
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mergers and acquisitions of medical groups and IPAs. Between 1994 and 1996 the 
number of physicians affiliated with these three PPMs grew from 3,787 to 25,763 
(Robinson, 1998). 
Changes in Vertical Relations in Health Care Markets 
Vertical associations in health care markets have increased as well. For example, 
the number of physician practices owned or managed by hospital-based systems 
increased by 60 percent between 1994 and 1995, from 7,015 to 11,234 (Jaklevic, 
1996a). Allina Health System, which covers approximately one-fourth of Minne- 
sota's residents through its HMO and PPO, is the result of a 1994 merger between 
a hospital chain and a health plan, and Allina is continuing to acquire hospitals 
and physician practices. Both the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and Blue 
Cross of Western Pennsylvania in Pittsburgh have independently been purchasing 
physician practices. Kaiser Permanente Health Plan in Dallas, an HMO, signed an 
exclusive, five-year contract with Columbia/HCA, then the largest for-profit hospital 
chain, in January 1995 (Atlantic Information Services, 1995). Further, there are 
many provider-owned HMOs and PPOs. For example, in 1997 four provider systems 
in northern California, including UC-Davis Health System and Mercy Healthcare 
in Sacramento, received an HMO license for Western Health Advantage, a HMO 
owned by affiliated physicians and hospital administrators (Kertesz, 1997). 
There is also some evidence of a trend toward looser vertical associations (a trend 
away from vertical integration and exclusive contracts) between insurers and pro- 
viders. A number of HMOs have sold off their physician operations, often to a 
physician management company, and then contracted with that company to pro- 
vide physician services. Examples include Aetna/U.S. Healthcare, FHP Interna- 
tional Corp., Foundation Health Corp., PacifiCare Health Systems, and Physician 
Corp. of America (Jaklevic, 1996b). Likewise, provider-owned HMOs and PPOs are 
increasingly being sold to insurers (Rauber, 1998). 
Competitive Issues Regarding the Restructuring of Health 
Care Markets 
The questions raised by the restructuring of health care markets are obvious; the 
answers are not so obvious. Does consolidation constitute an efficient response to 
external changes in demand, technology, and other forces? Or does it represent 
strategic attempts by firms to gain anticompetitive advantage? Some anecdotal ev- 
idence, from interviews with executives of health care institutions in the Boston 
area, indicates that both strategic motives and efficiency concerns are behind the 
bankruptcy protection. Medpartners decided to get out of the physician management business in 1998 
and has begun selling its physician clinics. 
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restructuring in health care markets (Barro and Cutler, 1997). To complicate mat- 
ters further, a full analysis must include not only price effects, but also dimensions 
of the health care industry like quality of care, the amount of consumer choice, 
biomedical innovation, or the provision of charity care to the poor. In what follows, 
we review some of the issues which have arisen in evaluating the restructuring of 
health care markets. 
Market Definition 
Discussions of competitiveness and market structure are always predicated on 
how the market is defined. The most controversial issue concerning health care 
market definition is how the growth of managed care changes both product and 
geographic market definitions. The rise of managed care presents a challenge to 
traditional market definition methodologies which presume that individual pa- 
tients, together with their physicians, choose freely among the available health care 
providers, and define geographic markets based on historical patient flows into and 
out of an area (Elzinga and Hogarty, 1973). Some managed care plans place severe 
restrictions on the set of hospitals and physicians from which an enrollee may 
choose, placing doubts on the appropriateness of this methodology. Moreover, a 
geographic market definition based on historical patient flows does not account 
for the effect of future price increases, and thus is consistent neither with economics 
nor the enforcement agencies' guidelines (Werden, 1989).4 
A recent Department ofJustice suit to block the merger of two hospitals on Long 
Island illustrates some of the hospital product market issues raised by the growth 
of managed care.5 Justice contended that in markets characterized by managed 
care, some hospitals are critical for a managed care plan to have in its network. 
The critical position of these so-called "anchor" hospitals gives them market power, 
even in an unconcentrated market, therefore the merger of the two anchor hos- 
pitals on Long Island would lead to monopoly power. Justice lost the suit. However, 
some evidence does indicate that certain differentiated hospitals may have market 
power, even in hospital markets that are not particularly concentrated by traditional 
measures (Town and Vistnes, 1997). 
Similarly, the geographic boundaries of hospital markets were at issue in a 1995 
U.S. district court decision in which the Department ofJustice had sought to block 
the merger of the only two general acute care hospitals in Dubuque, Iowa. The 
judge allowed the merger on the grounds that individuals, influenced by managed 
care, will travel 70-100 miles to obtain hospital care, and thus the merger did not 
result in undue geographic concentration.6 While the distance that consumers are 
willing to travel for hospital care is not a settled matter, some empirical evidence 
4 The federal antitrust enforcement agencies define the boundaries of a market in geographic or product 
space as those at which firms in the market could raise profitably price by 5 percent. 
5 United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 1997-2 Trade Cases ? 71,960. 
6 United States v. Mercy Health Services, No. C94-1023 (N.D. Iowa October 27, 1995). 
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indicates that managed care has almost no impact on the distance consumers travel 
for hospital services (Mobley and Frech, 1998). 
Likewise, it is unclear how managed care affects the definition of product markets 
for physician services (Haas-Wilson and Gaynor, 1998a). While physicians have well- 
defined specialties, it is not clear that these specialties define product markets. For 
example, many surgeons could offer primary care services like standard office visits, 
check-ups, and immunizations, while many other specialties, including general and 
family practitioners, could produce at least some surgeries. As an example of this 
issue, 65-70 pediatricians practicing in southern New Jersey recently proposed 
forming a network to contract with managed care plans. The pediatricians argued 
that the relevant product market included all primary care and specialty care phy- 
sicians who treat children-and thus that their network of pediatricians would not 
possess market power. However, the Department ofJustice argued that family prac- 
titioners are not substitutes for pediatricians in the formation of managed care 
physician networks.7 Under the government's market definition, the network would 
have a higher market share of 50 to 77 percent. 
With respect to health insurance, it is not clear whether HMOs and PPOs con- 
stitute a separate product market, or are part of the broader health insurance mar- 
ket.8 An economic answer to this question requires evidence on the extent to which 
buyers of insurance regard these types of insurance as substitutes. However, recent 
empirical evidence on cross-price elasticities may be of limited value for determin- 
ing market boundaries because these studies look at health plan choice within a 
single employer and do not account for the fact that health plans are sold to em- 
ployers, not to consumers directly (Buchmueller and Feldstein, 1997; Cutler and 
Reber, 1998; Royalty and Solomon, 1997). Thus, the employees in these studies are 
not choosing from among all health plans in the market, and the relative prices 
that employees face among health plans offered by their employers often do not 
reflect relative prices in the market. There is no nationally representative data set 
which contains information on plan offerings and premia paid by employers, who 
are the primary purchasers of health insurance.9 There is some evidence that con- 
ventional insurance premiums decline with HMO market share, suggesting these 
products may compete with each other (Baker and Corts, 1996). This is clearly 
another critical area for research. 
7Business Review Letter, March 1, 1996. 
8 In Blue Cross/Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, et al. v. Marshfield Clinic, et al., Case No. 95-1965 (7th 
Cir. slip op. September 18, 1995), the court defined the relevant market as the market for all health 
insurance, regardless of the type of contract. 
9 The Insurance Components of the National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES, 1987) and the Med- 
ical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS, in progress) conducted by the U.S. Agency for Health Care Policy 
Research (AHCPR) contain information on the full array of insurance choices offered by employers for 
those individuals in the sample. The sampling frame, however, is individuals, not employers or insurers. 
See (http://www.meps.ahcpr.gov) and (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/archivel.html) for more informa- 
tion on MEPS and NMES, respectively. 
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Potential Efficiency Gains from Horizontal Consolidation 
The trend toward horizontal consolidation is in part a response to changing 
factors in the health care market, like declining demand for inpatient hospital 
services, economies of scale, the shifting of risk from private and public insurers to 
providers, greater price and quality sensitivity on the part of buyers, and selective 
contracting by managed care organizations. Because of these underlying factors, a 
certain degree of horizontal consolidation in health care markets almost certainly 
adds to efficiency. We will discuss these factors in turn. 
One reason for horizontal consolidation is that many hospitals have found them- 
selves with substantial excess capacity as new technologies have led to less invasive 
medical interventions and more outpatient treatments. Closure, merger, or acqui- 
sition with reallocation of resources are all efficient responses to these changing 
market conditions. The costs of hospital excess capacity appear to be quite substan- 
tial. Gaynor and Anderson (1995) find that an empty bed cost $48,826 in 1995 
dollars, even after accounting for the need of hospitals to hold standby capacity to 
meet unexpected demand. Reducing the number of hospital beds by the amount 
necessary to increase the occupancy rate from the current average of 59 percent to 
79 percent would reduce hospital operating costs per patient by almost 9 percent. 
Keeler and Ying (1996) find similar numbers.'0 
The empirical evidence on consolidation and excess capacity is mixed. A survey 
of "survivors" from the 74 hospital mergers that occurred between 1983 and 1988 
suggests that more than half of these mergers resulted in substantial reductions in 
excess capacity (Bogue et al., 1995). In 17 percent of the mergers the acquired 
hospitals were closed and in 41 percent some general acute care capacity was con- 
verted to nonacute uses, such as psychiatric and substance abuse services, rehabil- 
itation, and long-term care. Recent case studies of hospital mergers in St. Louis and 
Philadelphia, however, found that while hospital mergers have led to consolidated 
administrative services, such as marketing, finance, public relations, and human 
resources, they have not reduced excess beds and facilities (Wicks, Meyer and Car- 
lyn, 1998). 
Economies of scale do not, however, appear to be substantial for HMOs or phy- 
sician practices. Scale economies in HMOs seem to be exhausted at relatively small 
sizes, in the range of 50,000 to 115,000 enrollees (Wholey et al., 1996; Given, 1996). 
The extant literature on physician groups suggests that scale economies for such 
practices are also exhausted at relatively small sizes-three to five physicians (Pope 
and Burge, 1996). Most of this literature, however, uses data from the 1970s. The 
structure of production for physician groups may have changed since then. Possible 
sources of efficiency gains for physician networks include risk sharing, by sharing 
10 Both Gaynor and Anderson (1995) and Keeler and Ying (1996), however, employ data on hospitals 
from the 1980s. It is possible that hospitals have adjusted since then, due to the long-lasting nature of 
decreases in demand and due to reduced prices, so that the costs of excess capacity may currently be 
lower than measured by these studies. 
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capitated contracts, and clinical integration, by jointly monitoring and improving 
quality. However, we are not aware of any empirical evidence on the actual size of 
the efficiencies associated with physician networks. 
A second reason for horizontal consolidation is that managed care has changed 
reimbursement practices to sellers of health care services in ways which shift risk to 
them. For example, a form of reimbursement used for physicians is capitation, in 
which the physician practice is paid a fixed rate per enrolled member per month. 
Capitation accounted for 7 percent of physician revenue in 1997 (Moran, 1998). 
Practitioners can affect the risk that costs of treatment will exceed the fixed capi- 
tation rate through the efficiency and quality of their services, but some of the risk 
of unexpectedly high medical costs is beyond the practitioner's control, such as the 
risk of a group of patients contracting an illness which is particularly expensive to 
treat." Increasing the size of the insured population by increasing the number of 
providers in the group/network is one way to diversify against this risk, since it 
increases the size of the risk pool and reduces the variability in medical treatment 
utilization and costs (Gaynor and Gertler, 1995). The introduction of the Medicare 
Prospective Payment System in 1983 created a similar set of incentives for hospitals. 
It changed reimbursement for hospitals from a system of reimbursement based on 
costs to a system with regulated prices. Since hospitals now are at risk for deviations 
in cost from price, they also have an incentive to diversify by expanding in size. 
A third pressure for horizontal consolidation comes from the employers who 
purchase insurance, who face both rising costs of health insurance and complaints 
from employees over quality of service. One result has been increased monitoring 
of health care services through development and imposition of treatment protocols, 
preauthorization requirements for certain tests or referrals, creating profiles for 
comparing physicians' utilization patterns, and quality assurance activities. Since 
the implementation of monitoring systems involves fixed costs, larger firms can 
spread these costs over more patients and realize lower per unit costs. However, it 
is not clear that a firm must be particularly large to achieve these efficiencies. Fur- 
ther, in many markets third-party firms specializing in these services have sprung 
up, decreasing the importance of this particular efficiency justification for larger 
size. 
Finally, the spread of selective contracting by managed care plans has left pro- 
viders concerned about whether they might be excluded from the main provider 
networks. Many consolidations can be understood as jockeying for position to make 
sure not to be the one left standing when the music stops, or as an attempt by 
" Other forms of health finance contracts have spread which also have the property of shifting insurance 
risk from the insurer to the seller. Some of the other contracts are percentage of premium contracts, in 
which the seller takes a percentage of the insurance premium, and fee-for-service contracts with a with- 
hold, in which the seller is paid on a schedule determining fees for each service, but a prespecified 
amount or percentage is withheld, subject to a performance standard being met. 
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providers to improve their bargaining positions relative to insurers. Such responses 
may be efficiency-enhancing-or not. 
Potential Efficiency Gains from Vertical Consolidation 
There are no general results in economic theory on whether vertical consolida- 
tion tends to increase efficiency, or to enhance firms' market power. The specifics 
of the situation dictate which dominates, as Katz (1989) reviews in general terms 
and Gaynor and Haas-Wilson (1998) discuss in the health care context. 
Many of the same factors that provide an efficiency rationale for horizontal con- 
solidation also provide stimuli for increasing vertical consolidation-whether in the 
form of mergers, acquisitions, or tighter contractual relations-between physicians, 
hospitals, and insurers. For example, vertical mergers or exclusive contractual ar- 
rangements may lower the transactions costs of contracting between insurers and 
physicians, insurers and hospitals, or hospitals and physicians. Further, the tasks of 
monitoring and controlling health care utilization and quality may be done more 
efficiently in organizations where physicians, hospitals, and insurers are integrated 
or have long-term contracts, and thus share similar goals and aligned incentives. 
Anticompetitive Concerns and Barriers to Entry 
As health care firms have decreased in number and increased in size, the possi- 
bility of the exercise of market power has risen. In simple economic models, this 
involves the ability to raise price and reduce quantity. In addition, impacts on qual- 
ity, consumer choice, the provision of charity care, and innovation are all social 
welfare concerns in health care markets, although they are not part of the tradi- 
tional domain of antitrust. 
For horizontal or vertical consolidation to have anticompetitive effects in health 
care markets, there must be barriers to entry in those markets. If there are no 
barriers, then even incumbents with large market shares will be unable to manip- 
ulate price to earn excess profits without inducing entry by potential entrants. Bar- 
riers to entry can stem from absolute cost advantages, sunk costs, and pre-entry 
strategic behaviors. We will consider each of these in turn.'2 
An incumbent's absolute cost advantage can arise from a number of factors. 
Perhaps the most important factors in the context of health care markets are in- 
cumbents' strategies that raise costs for potential entrants. One such strategy in- 
volves contractual arrangements between managed care insurers and sellers of 
12 Some would argue that economies of scale should also be considered an entry barrier. There is a long- 
standing argument among industrial organization economists over this categorization.Joe Bain held that 
barriers to entry were any factor that allows an incumbent to maintain price above average cost, while 
George Stigler offered a more narrow definition of an entry barrier as a cost that must be borne by 
potential entrants, that is not (or has not been) borne by the incumbent. Bain's definition includes 
economies of scale, while Stigler's definition includes only absolute cost advantages. For a detailed dis- 
cussion of the issue, see Geroski, Gilbert and Jacquemin (1990). 
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health care services. If a managed care firm has exclusive contracts (or is vertically 
integrated) with a large portion of the providers in the market-especially if these 
contracts are with the highest quality providers or the most efficient providers in 
the market-then the remaining independent providers may be insufficient to al- 
low efficient entry by another firm. A related contractual step are "most-favored- 
nation" clauses, also called most-favored-customer clauses, which are vertical con- 
tractual agreements in which the seller (for example, a hospital or physician group/ 
network) agrees to give the buyer (for example, an insurer) the lowest price it 
charges any buyer. Such clauses can have the procompetitive effect of allowing 
buyers of health care services to lower their costs. But they also may serve to facilitate 
tacit collusion, since a dominant insurer who signs a contract including a most- 
favored-nation clause has basically assured that the hospital or physician group will 
not provide services at lower fees to rival insurers or potential entrants (Baker, 1996; 
Salop, 1986). Antitrust policy concerning most-favored nation clauses in health care 
contracts is unsettled. The courts have effectively treated such clauses as per se legal 
(Bloch, Perlman and Levasseur, 1996), but the federal antitrust enforcement agen- 
cies have blocked their use via consent decrees. 
The existing health economics research on the subject of using contracts to deter 
entry is scant and the results are mixed. Various theoretical models have been 
constructed where exclusive contracts between insurers and providers are either 
anticompetitive (Encinosa, 1996; Gal-Or, 1997a) or neutral (Gaynor and Ma, 1996) 
in their effects on competition in the insurance market. However, existing models 
have presumed that the exclusive dealing provisions in contracts are truly binding, 
when the extent to which they bind is instead determined by factors like whether 
they have substantial enforceable penalties for breach of contract and if they are 
of a fairly long duration. 
While theoretical models suggest that vertical mergers and exclusive contracts 
can be anticompetitive in general (Riordan and Salop, 1995), the issue of whether 
vertical mergers or exclusive dealing can lead to foreclosure in real-world health 
care markets remains an open question. Vertical relations between health care firms 
have been especially hot topics in New Hampshire and Wisconsin. Legislation ban- 
ning exclusive contracts between HMOs and health care providers in New Hamp- 
shire took effect in June 1997. In Wisconsin, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Wisconsin 
charged that the Marshfield Clinic, a physician-owned clinic that was vertically in- 
tegrated with its HMO, had excluded the Blue Cross/Blue Shield HMO from the 
HMO market by foreclosing the market for physician services, but lost the case.'3 
It has also been argued that vertical restraints can confer monopoly power by 
facilitating horizontal coordination or collusion (Katz, 1989). In 1995 and 1996, 
the Department of Justice brought civil enforcement actions against physician- 
13 Blue Cross/Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, et al. v. Marshfield Clinic, et al., Case No. 95-1965 (7th 
Cir. slip op. September 18, 1995). 
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hospital organizations in Danbury, Connecticut, St. Joseph, Missouri, and Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana, arguing that vertical restraints between monopoly hospitals and 
a large share of physicians in the market restrained competition in the physician 
services market, and resulted in higher prices for physician services. 
Another incumbent strategy that may deter entry in health care markets is over- 
investing in capacity, especially in irreversible or sunk capital, which can signal 
potential entrants that incumbents are willing and able to respond to new compet- 
itors with a surge of output that would make that entry unprofitable. The only paper 
we are aware of considering these issues in health is Gal-Or (1997b), which consid- 
ers hospital mergers as a means of acquiring excess capacity to price aggressively in 
the presence of entry. 
Sunk costs, even when they are small, can bestow significant advantages on an 
incumbent (Gilbert, 1986). There may be sunk costs of entry for managed care 
firms due to the costs of building a provider network, such as the costs of identifying 
cost-effective and high quality providers, or the costs of finding compatible infor- 
mation systems with providers for billing, utilization management, and quality as- 
surance. If a physician or hospital cannot compete for managed care contracts 
unless it is part of a network, and if the costs of building a network are large and 
sunk, then individual physicians or hospitals may no longer be viable competitors 
or potential entrants. However, there has been very little analysis of sunk costs in 
health care markets, either concerning the magnitude of these costs or whether 
the costs associated with networks or utilization or quality management should be 
considered as sunk. 
Empirical Evidence on the Exercise of Market Power in Health 
Care Markets 
Traditional analyses of anticompetitive behavior have focused on price, and our 
discussion here will lay out the available evidence on price. However, in health care 
markets, where providers jointly set price and quality, higher prices in a given mar- 
ket may also reflect higher quality, rather than providing prima facie evidence of 
market power.'4 Some evidence concerning quality is given below, but this evidence 
is still sparse. However, a great deal of effort in recent years has gone into generating 
empirical measures of health care quality, particularly for hospital care; thus, there 
is the potential for addressing this issue directly in future research. Where evidence 
is available concerning how changes in market structure have affected consumer 
choice, the provision of charity care, and innovation, we will mention these factors 
as well. 
14 For a recent court case making this point, see the decision in Blue Cross/Blue Shield United of 
Wisconsin, et al. v. Marshfield Clinic, et al., Case No. 95-1965 (7th Cir. slip op. September 18, 1995). 
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Most of the available empirical evidence focuses on horizontal consolidation 
within certain sectors: hospitals, physicians, insurers. We will first review that evi- 
dence, and then add a few words about evidence on effects of vertical consolidation. 
Hospitals 
The most extensive research evidence on competitive conduct by firms in health 
care markets is on hospitals; Dranove and White (1994) offer an extensive survey. 
These studies use differing product and geographic market definitions and research 
methods, yet the consistency of the results is striking. Increased concentration is 
associated with increased prices in markets for hospital services. Likewise, concen- 
tration in hospital markets appears to increase hospitals' bargaining power relative 
to insurers and self-insured firms (Melnick et al., 1992; Brooks, Dor and Wong, 
1997). 
More recent studies have examined the impact of hospital mergers on costs and 
prices. Connor et al. (1998) studied the effects of 122 hospital mergers, using data 
from over 3,500 hospitals covering the period 1986-1994. They find that, on av- 
erage, merging hospitals reduced costs relative to non-merging hospitals. However, 
they also found that mergers in concentrated markets led to significantly lower cost 
savings. Further, they find that merging hospitals have smaller percentage price 
increases than nonmerging hospitals, which is consistent with hospital mergers en- 
hancing efficiency. However, looking only at concentrated markets, merging hos- 
pitals have higher percentage price increases, which is consistent with hospital merg- 
ers enhancing hospitals' market power. Likewise, Krishnan (1998) finds that merg- 
ers increase the prices of those individual hospital services for which the merging 
hospitals gain market share. 
A number of papers specifically examine the behavior of nonprofit hospitals 
(Dranove and Ludwick, 1999; Keeler, Melnick and Zwanziger, 1999; Lynk, 1995; 
Lynk and Neumann, 1999; Simpson and Shin, 1998), and most find a positive re- 
lationship between price and concentration.'5 The willingness of not-for-profit hos- 
pitals to exercise market power has been an especially hot issue in recent antitrust 
cases, where it has been argued-for example, in a recent court decision to allow 
the merger of the two largest hospitals in Grand Rapids, Michigan"6-that nonprofit 
hospitals seek to maximize the welfare of their communities (or at least are con- 
strained by the presence of a board of trustees drawn from the local community) 
and thus will not exercise market power even if given the opportunity. The evidence 
on the pricing behavior of nonprofit hospitals suggests that as a general view of 
nonprofits, this is overoptimistic. 
15 The exceptions are Lynk (1995) and Lynk and Neumann (1999). The studies differ in a number of 
ways, including state covered, period covered, and specification. See Keeler et al. (1999), Lynk and 
Neumann (1999), and Dranove and Ludwick (1999) for discussions on the possible sources of these 
differences. 
16 Federal Trade Commission v. Butterworth Health Corporation and Blodgett Memorial Medical Center, 
1996-2 Trade Cases 71,571; 1996 QL 570479 (W.D. Mich. September 26, 1996). 
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Some efforts have been made to take into effect non-price hospital competition. 
One set of studies has examined hospital costs or service offerings; another set has 
examined patient health outcomes. Robinson and Luft (1985) find that hospital 
costs are greater in less concentrated markets, presumably due to greater non-price 
competition. Zwanziger and Melnick (1988) find that this relationship exists for 
California hospitals in the early 1980s, but disappears by 1985. The general finding 
for hospital service offerings is that they are fewer in less competitive markets. Luft 
et al. (1986) found that hospital service offerings increased for the most part with 
the number of other hospitals within a five- and 15-mile radius, using national data 
from 1972. Dranove, Shanley and Simon (1992) find that California hospitals in 
1982 tended to offer more services in less concentrated markets, but that the effects 
are small. However, a lower range of services may not represent a welfare loss, given 
that health care providers may tend to overinvest in certain technologies. Moreover, 
these studies predate the emergence of managed care as a substantial force in 
health care markets, so it is hard to know whether these patterns have persisted. 
No consistent pattern has emerged from studies of the impact of competition on 
health outcomes, but some of the recent results are disturbing. Kessler and Mc- 
Clellan (1998) find a positive relationship between concentration and mortality 
from heart attacks, suggesting that perhaps hospitals take advantage of market 
power by skimping on quality. Hamilton and Ho (1998) conclude that hospital 
mergers have no impact on inpatient mortality from heart attacks and strokes, but 
a negative impact on quality measured as readmissions within 90 days. Volpp and 
Waldfogel (1998) show that heart attack mortality in NewJersey increased following 
hospital rate deregulation, implying that more active price competition was accom- 
panied by a decrease in quality competition. Clearly, further research is essential 
in this area. 
A final issue surrounding hospital conduct concerns competition and hospital 
provision of charity care. While Frank and Salkever (1991) found no relationship 
between concentration and the provision of charity care in Maryland, both Gruber 
(1994) and Mann, Melnick, Bamezai and Zwanziger (1995) find that hospitals in 
less concentrated markets in California provided more charity care in the 1980s. 
Again, more research is needed in this area, both because of the relative paucity of 
evidence, and because markets have changed considerably since these studies were 
undertaken. 
Physicians 
Prior to the growth of managed care, entry by physicians into large urban 
areas was easy, but physicians possessed some market power due to information 
asymmetries between themselves and patients and the inherent heterogeneity 
of services or idiosyncratic patient preferences. These markets could be consid- 
ered as monopolistically competitive (Satterthwaite, 1979), and the empirical 
evidence is consistent with this intuition (Wong, 1995; McCarthy, 1985). There 
is also some empirical research showing that physicians are mobile and respond 
154 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
to income opportunities-in particular, that physicians locate in progressively 
smaller population areas as their numbers increase over time (Newhouse et al., 
1982). Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) examine entry into small markets for a num- 
ber of different products; with regard to physician services, they find that a rel- 
atively small amount of entry rapidly provides the benefits of competition. 
While the evidence does not indicate that collusion has been an important phe- 
nomenon in most markets for physician services, there are some particular cases 
for concern, as documented by Frech (1996). Markets for specialized services, or 
markets in rural areas, may be dominated by a small number of physician firms. 
The research findings are far from definitive with regard to this issue, and in par- 
ticular, incumbent control of referrals and hospital privileges acting as a barrier to 
entry has not been examined. 
Whatever the past status of physician markets, the growth of networks of physi- 
cians who practice independently but contract collectively with managed care plans 
certainly has the potential to alter the competitiveness of these markets.'7 Since a 
managed care plan contracts with all the physicians affiliated with a network to- 
gether, networks may increase product differentiation in the market for physician 
services; as a result, networks have some power to increase price (Vistnes, 1992). 
However, network formation is not part of the Vistnes analysis, and it is not clear 
the same results would obtain in a model in which network formation is considered. 
Further, patient demand for the option to go to a differentiated provider can bestow 
market power on that provider when managed care insurance limits consumers' 
insured access to a subset of providers (Dranove and White, 1996). There is little 
empirical research as of yet on the impacts of networks, with the exception of a 
paper by Town and Vistnes (1997) showing that hospital prices increase with the 
degree of differentiation between a network hospital and the next best substitute 
outside the network. 
Recent federal antitrust enforcement regarding physicians has mostly focused on 
physician networks. The issue is whether these networks result in efficiencies or 
damage competition by facilitating collusion among physicians (Haas-Wilson and 
Gaynor, 1998b). The Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice have 
indicated that networks below a certain size will not be challenged; for example, 
nonexclusive networks that include 30 percent or fewer of the physicians in the 
same specialty and exclusive networks that include 20 percent or fewer of the phy- 
sicians in the same specialty. Risk sharing or clinically integrated networks that fall 
outside these "safety zones" are evaluated under the rule of reason or the potential 
anticompetitive impacts are weighed against possible efficiency gains. 
17 There are two variants of this practice. In the first approach, physician firms in the network market 
themselves collectively to managed care plans, but set prices independently. To reduce the risk of price 
collusion, a third party is retained to collect price information from each of the firms and convey it to 
a plan. In the second approach, the firms not only market themselves collectively, but set price collec- 
tively. 
Martin Gaynor and Deborah Haas-Wilson 155 
Another issue is the emergence of physician unions, which act as collective bar- 
gaining agents for physicians. The difference with traditional trade unions is that 
the vast majority of physicians are not employees of the insurance firms they are 
bargaining with, but are independent firms. Collective price setting by independent 
firms, such as that engaged in by a collective bargaining entity, is not allowed, on 
the grounds that this is price fixing; the Department ofJustice is prosecuting a case 
on those grounds.'8 Physicians, however, argue that collective bargaining is neces- 
sary to allow them to counteract insurer monopsony power (although the argument 
is not stated in precisely those terms). 
This argument may not be sensible, for two reasons. First, if the problem is mo- 
nopsony power by insurers, then the obvious solution is to fix this problem, rather 
than creating monopoly power on the part of physicians. Second, it is not obvious 
that insurers currently possess substantial monopsony power with regard to physi- 
cians. Most markets have multiple insurers, implying a need for some sort of col- 
lusion among them as a necessary condition to achieve monopsony power. Even if 
that is achieved, if physician entry and exit from local markets is fairly easy, then if 
insurers reduce physician payments substantially physicians will leave the market or 
new physicians will not enter.'9 This implies that the supply of physician services to 
an insurer is likely to be elastic, rendering monopsony power of insurers low. On 
the other hand, if the growth of managed care is reducing the elasticity of physician 
supply (Haas-Wilson and Gaynor, 1998a), then the possibility of monopsony power 
may be increasing. New research on buying competition by insurers and the aggre- 
gate supply of physician services in local markets characterized by managed care is 
clearly needed. 
Insurers 
There is little recent empirical evidence on competitive conduct by health insur- 
ance firms. In the past, a variety of evidence pointed towards Blue Cross plans 
exercising market power due to large discounts granted them by providers (Frech, 
1996, Ch. 6, surveys the literature). However, it seems unlikely now that much 
advantage remains for the majority of Blue Cross plans. 
Some initial attempts have been made to assess the conduct of HMOs; the results 
are roughly consistent with competition increasing with entry. Feldman et al. (1993) 
find that when Medicare beneficiaries have a choice of two or more HMOs, the 
HMOs are dramatically less likely to charge large supplemental premiums above 
the regulated price set by Medicare. Similarly, Ellis (forthcoming) finds that when 
18 The case is United States v. Federation of Physicians and Dentists, Inc., 98475, 8/12/98. It is permissible 
for a third party to collect and transmit price information from a network of independent physician 
firms to an insurer so long as the price information is not collectively agreed upon by, or transmitted 
between, the physician firms (this has been termed the "messenger model" by the enforcement agen- 
cies). 
19 Evidence from the Medicaid program indicating that physician participation in the program is strongly 
responsive to fees is consistent with this possibility. 
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state employees have more health plan choices, family premiums decrease. How- 
ever, he also finds that increases in the number of HMOs in a state are associated 
with increases in premiums. On the other hand, Wholey et al. (1995) find that 
premiums charged by HMOs in private markets decline with the number of firms 
in the market.20 However, since they only have information on HMOs, not all man- 
aged care plans or the entire health insurance market, and since it is unclear that 
there is a separate product market for HMO insurance, it is not clear how to inter- 
pret the results. Better data and more sophisticated modeling could lead to signif- 
icant advances in our understanding of competition in this market. 
As managed care plans have exercised bargaining power in negotiations with 
health care providers, concern has arisen over the exercise of monopsony power 
(Pauly, 1998). A number of empirical studies have attempted to detect Blue Cross 
monopsony power, but we are not aware of any such studies of managed care. If 
the current consolidation on both sides of the market continues, many markets will 
be bilateral oligopolies. We will need substantial theoretical development as well as 
empirical work in order to understand the implications of this structure. 
A final issue that has gained recent policy prominence is the impact of managed 
care on access to care and quality of care. Great concern has been expressed about 
whether patients in managed care plans receive lower quality care. The evidence is 
mixed, and it is unclear what impacts managed care is actually having, let alone 
whether those impacts are due to excessive competition or lack of competition 
(Miller and Luft, 1997). In a recent paper, Encinosa (1998) shows that regulation 
can solve the risk segmentation problem that arises in a perfectly competitive mar- 
ket, but also finds that such regulation can actually decrease welfare if the market 
is imperfectly competitive. This is an area in which research is clearly needed, but 
for which the data obstacles are substantial. 
Empirical Evidence on Vertical Consolidation in Health Care Markets 
There is virtually no empirical research providing evidence on the impacts of 
vertical restraints in health care markets. One exception is a paper by Lynk and 
Morrisey (1987), who consider exclusive dealing between hospitals and physician 
groups in hospital-based specialties like radiology, anesthesiology or pathology. 
They contend that these sorts of exclusive deals are efficiency enhancing, by align- 
ing the incentives of physicians with the hospital. They find a slightly negative re- 
lationship between exclusive contracting and concentration in a market, and infer 
that exclusive contracts do not bestow market power on physicians. However, Dan- 
ger and Frech (1997) show that proper calculation of the effect of concentration 
on exclusive contracting reveals a positive relationship. 
Vertical consolidation in health care markets is an important topic for future 
2" They do, however, obtain the seemingly strange result that premiums are constant with regard to the 
number of firms for independent practice association (IPA) type HMOs up until there are 13 firms in 
the market, and they decline with the number of firms thereafter. 
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research. The data requirements are substantial. Not only must relevant price and 
cost information be obtained from the different sectors, like physicians and hos- 
pitals, but which firms are linked with each other and the nature of those links 
must be known. 
Is Competition Best in Health Care Markets? 
In many industries, the link between competition and social welfare seems fairly 
direct. But health care markets are characterized by multiple imperfections and 
differences from "standard" markets, in large part deriving from the asymmetry of 
information between buyers and sellers and the uncertainty inherent in the nature 
of medical care (Arrow, 1963), which is argued to result a variety of phenomena 
including moral hazard, risk selection, induced demand by sellers of health care 
services, the pervasive presence of not-for-profit firms, the "medical arms race," 
and poor consumer information. In the context of this paper, the issue is not the 
existence or magnitude of these phenomena, or how one might design policies to 
deal with them, but rather a narrower question: Does greater competition in the 
health care industry ameliorate or exacerbate these issues? 
Moral hazard occurs in health care markets since the insurance that protects 
consumers from the financial risks of illness also reduces the price of health care 
they face; hence, they increase their consumption of health care services beyond 
what it would have been were they not insured (Pauly, 1968). Since moral hazard 
induces excessive consumption, it might seem that market power on the part of 
firms selling health care services could improve matters by restricting output, and 
that competition would worsen this problem (Crew, 1969). However, this assumes 
that insurance policies in a competitive market do not adjust-for example, with 
copayments and premiums-to deal with moral hazard. Once such adjustments are 
taken into account, there is no reason to believe that greater competition will 
worsen this problem (Gaynor, Haas-Wilson and Vogt, 1997). 
A second imperfection in health care markets concerns the functioning of com- 
petitive insurance markets in the face of risk selection. If individuals know their 
own risk type (say high or low) but insurers do not, then either high risk individuals 
purchase complete insurance while low risk types purchase incomplete insurance, 
or an insurance market will fail to exist, since potential insurers will be too fearful 
of attracting only bad risks. 
However, in practice, most individuals are not dipping in and out of the insurance 
market as their health prospects deteriorate or improve (Neipp and Zeckhauser, 
1985; Royalty and Solomon, 1997). Conversely, if insurers can discern the risk types 
of individuals but cannot risk adjust premiums, then insurers will engage in "cream 
skimming" or "cherry picking," seeking out good risks and avoiding bad risks 
(Newhouse, 1996). The empirical evidence suggests that HMOs have had some 
success in enrolling persons with lower health risks, as opposed to conventional 
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insurance plans (Newhouse, 1996). Cutler and Reber (1998) find that within three 
years of Harvard University's switch to a system of paying a fixed contribution in- 
dependent of health plan choice (that is, increasing consumers' incentives to search 
for the most efficient health plans), risk selection had forced the exit of the most 
generous insurance plan. But taking these patterns as a whole, it is unclear whether 
increases in competition make risk-selection a substantially worse problem than it 
already is. 
A third imperfection in health care markets is the asymmetric information be- 
tween physicians and patients which leads to an agency relationship and thus, the 
potential for physicians to induce demand for their services.2' The empirical liter- 
ature on this topic suffers from such severe methodological flaws that it does not 
provide useful evidence on either the existence or magnitude of this effect (Gaynor, 
1994). While it seems likely that some inducement exists, neither theory nor current 
evidence indicate that competition is likely to increase distortions from this market 
imperfection (Stano, 1987).22 
A fourth issue often raised with regard to the special nature of competition 
in hospital markets is that, due to insurance, hospitals do not compete on price 
to attract patients, but rather compete on quality or facilities to attract patients 
(or doctors, who then bring patients with them). This behavior has been referred 
to as the "medical arms race." This scenario has some plausibility for hospitals 
prior to the 1990s. However, the heightened price competition among hospitals 
since that time, presumably to attract contracts from managed care firms by 
aggressively negotiating on price, is probably reducing the amount of nonprice 
competition. We do not know what amount of nonprice competition is optimal. 
The more relevant concern for the 1990s and beyond is whether increasing price 
competition in health care markets characterized by poorly informed consumers 
may lead to too little quality relative to the socially optimal level or to the under- 
provision of health care services. Health care consumers are often poorly informed 
about both prices (Gaynor and Polachek, 1994) and quality (Haas-Wilson, 1994), 
and Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992) show that increasing price information when 
consumers are uncertain about quality can decrease welfare. Further, available mea- 
sures of quality can be "blunt, expensive, incomplete, and distorting. And, unless 
great care is taken, they can easily be inaccurate and misleading" (Eddy, 1998). 
Whether consumers are rationally ignoring this information or not able to process 
21 Emons (1997) and Vogt (1998), on the other hand, offer theoretical results in which no inducement 
occurs in equilibrium, even though sellers have the ability to induce. 
22 If physician firms are not profit maximizers, but utility maximizers, then it may be possible that income 
effects can lead to increased inducement in response to entry. This is a version of the backward-bending 
labor supply curve; competition reduces prices, and physicians in the backward-bending part of the curve 
react to their lower wages by working more. To our knowledge, there are no papers that have analyzed 
precisely this situation. However, substitution effects typically outweigh income effects by a wide margin 
(Rizzo and Blumenthal, 1994), so that even if physicians maximize utility (rather than profit) the evi- 
dence is not consistent with an increase in inducement in response to entry and price decreases. 
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it, it is not clear how well consumers use available health plan or provider quality 
information (Chernew and Scanlon, 1998; Hibbard andJewett, 1997; Mennemeyer, 
Morrisey, and Howard, 1997). 
On a more positive note, both theory (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983) 
and empirical research (Haas-Wilson, 1990) suggest that when consumers can learn 
providers' and insurers' reputations, health care markets can still function effec- 
tively. Further, there is ongoing work in developing mechanisms to measure pro- 
vider and health plan quality and disseminate this information (President's Advisory 
Commission, 1998). The hope is that increasing the availability of information on 
quality will facilitate the provision of quality by stimulating competition based on 
quality and by allowing payments linked to the actual provision of quality. None- 
theless, if only some aspects of quality can be measured, then such strategies may 
only serve to emphasize what is measurable at the expense of what is not.23 The jury 
is still out on this crucial issue, but the attempts to develop and use quality measures 
provide fertile opportunities for empirical research. 
Conclusion and Implications for Competition Policy 
Given the increasing reliance on markets to allocate health care resources, health 
care policy should seek to ensure that these markets work efficiently. Cautious en- 
forcement of the antitrust laws is essential both to prevent monopoly power and to 
ensure that antitrust enforcement activity does not discourage the growth of new 
and efficient forms of health care organization. However, the task of drawing the 
line between practices and arrangements that have net efficiency enhancing effects 
and those that have net market power enhancing effects is especially difficult in 
industries experiencing rapid transition, such as health care. 
The federal antitrust enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission, have been quite active in the health care area. They 
adopted and revised new antitrust guidelines for health care three times between 
1993 and 1996.24 The FTC has a specific section of their web site devoted to "Health 
Care Antitrust" at (http://www.ftc.gov/bc/health.htm), the only such industry with 
its own section. In addition, there has been considerable state and private antitrust 
activity. However, recent federal enforcement policy can be characterized as cau- 
tious. The combined agencies challenged only about 2 percent of the 956 hospital 
premerger filings they received between 1981 and 1997 (Leibenluft, 1998). 
23 If unmeasurable features are correlated with what is measured then this may not be a problem. How- 
ever, this seems unlikely to be the case with health care. Indeed, some of the measured aspects of quality 
themselves are not correlated with each other (Haas-Wilson, 1994; Chernew and Scanlon, 1998). 
24 DOJ/FTC, "Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in the Health Care Area," September 15, 
1993, DOJ/FTC, "Statements of Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care 
and Antitrust," September 27, 1994, and DOJ/FTC "Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in 
Health Care," August 1996. 
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Proposals before Congress call for the loosening of the application of antitrust laws 
to health care providers; Harris and Fenton (1996) offer a discussion. If enacted, these 
proposals would effectively limit the ability of antitrust enforcers to police health care 
markets. Further, a number of states are passing "state action immunity" legislation, 
under which firms in specific industries (including health care) can be exempted from 
federal antitrust laws if they are subject to state supervision-although it is unclear how 
effective state supervision will be at limiting the exercise of market power in health 
care. At last count, 23 states had passed such legislation. 
No one knows what health care markets will look like when the dust settles. Research 
on the issues raised in this paper can help public policy to encourage those organiza- 
tional structures and market practices that enhance efficiency and quality, rather than 
the ones that only serve to increase providers' or insurers' market power. 
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